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I.

ABSTRACT

On one side of the spectrum, certain courts, such as New
York, define gross negligence as conduct that borders intentional
wrongdoing. On the other side of the spectrum, courts continue to
recognize the degrees of negligence and differentiate between
various degrees of care. Between these two approaches, there is
inconsistency. For instance, some Illinois decisions equate gross
negligence to recklessness, while others define it as nothing more
than “very great negligence.”1 This Article concludes that the
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latter may be the proper standard relied upon by a majority of the
recent decisions interpreting Illinois law, but advocates for a
uniform definition to ease the burden on the parties attempting to
define this imprecise term. Lastly, it provides a table of various
definitions of “gross negligence” among all fifty states.

II. INTRODUCTION
[W]hen one attempts to define “gross negligence” the concept
shatters into a kaleidoscopic disarray of terms, elements and subtle
graduations of meaning. It is a legal Tower of Babel, where many
voices are heard, but few are generally understood.2

This Article identifies inconsistencies between courts’
definitions of “gross negligence.” Although it largely focuses on the
definitions of “gross negligence” under New York and Illinois laws,
the Article also provides a brief fifty-state survey identifying case
law within each jurisdiction and the courts’ application of this
term across the state lines. In sum, the Article first provides an
overview of negligence and gross negligence. Second, the Article
focuses on the interpretation of gross negligence as applied by New
York federal and state courts. In doing so, it evaluates New York
courts’ application of the term in various contexts involving
contract disputes. Third, it discusses the language Illinois courts
use to define gross negligence as applied in various contexts.
Consequently, it identifies the inconsistencies and disagreement
among Illinois courts and analyzes the contradicting definitions of
this term. Lastly, it provides a table of cases that lists each
jurisdiction’s definition of gross negligence and points to the
relevant authorities to aid legal researchers in tackling this
nebulous term.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Gross Negligence and Its
Inconsistent Application Across Jurisdictions
Generally, while a finding of negligence is a question of fact
for a jury,3 “it is the province of the court to lay down the rules by
which the jury is to be governed in determining what is

1. See infra Part II (discussing a split between jurisdictions and focusing
on New York and Illinois precedent).
2. Daniel O. Howard, An Analysis of Gross Negligence, 37 MARQ. L. REV.
334, 334 (1953–54).
3. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Trio Realty Co., 99 Civ. 10827 (LAP), 2002
WL 123506, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2002). See also Sommer v. Fed. Signal
Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (N.Y. 1992); Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consol. Edison
Co., 429 N.E.2d 738, 740 (N.Y. 1981).
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negligence.”4 Both ordinary and gross negligence generally require
the same elements to establish liability: a duty owed to a plaintiff
by a defendant; a breach of that duty; a causal link between the
breach and the plaintiff’s losses; and damages.5 The distinguishing
factor between the two causes of action is the defendant’s degree of
care, or lack thereof, in causing the alleged losses.
Gross negligence requires a greater lack of care than is
implied by the term ordinary negligence.6 The standard for
ordinary negligence is “a failure to use the care which an
ordinarily prudent man would use under the circumstances.”7
Thus, to constitute gross negligence, “the act or omission must be
of an aggravated character as distinguished from the failure to
exercise ordinary care.”8
Over the years, however, courts have struggled with
interpreting rules applicable to gross negligence.9 One court, while
attempting to define the term, eloquently described gross
negligence as a “twilight zone which exists somewhere between
ordinary negligence and intentional injury.”10 And yet, when
taking a peek into this “twilight zone,” the abundant scholarly
commentary shows that various jurisdictions apply a myriad of
different tests to determine whether a particular conduct amounts
to gross negligence.
Some courts have reasoned that gross negligence remains an
“inadvertent act,” holding that gross negligence is merely a
conduct that is different in degree from ordinary negligence (i.e., a
very great negligence).11 Other courts, however, find gross
negligence to be different from ordinary negligence in its nature,
quality, or kind;12 these jurisdictions require an element of
consciousness or intent to harm, which is not found in cases of
ordinary negligence.13 Essentially, the subjective state of mind of
an actor is the key factor differentiating the two views because
intent, whether implied or actual, creates a different kind of
4. Terre Haute & I.R. Co. v. Jenuine, 16 Ill. App. 209, 213 (3d Dist. 1885)
(cited in 28 ILL. LAW & PRAC. NEGLIGENCE § 169).
5. See generally Purchase Partners, LLC v. Carver Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 09
Civ. 9687, 2012 WL 6641633, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.13, 2012).
6. Internationale Nederlanden Capital Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., 689
N.Y.S.2d 455, 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Higgins v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 702
N.Y.S.2d 502, 506 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1999).
7. See e.g., Jones v. Chi. HMO Ltd., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1130 (Ill. 2000).
8. Weld v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 103 N.E. 957, 961 (N.Y. 1913).
9. Fid. Leasing Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (stating that meaning of gross negligence varies across jurisdictions).
10. Pleasant v. Johnson, 325 S.E.2d 244, 247 (N.C. 1985).
11. W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 34, at 211,
212 (5th ed. 1984). See e.g., NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F.
Supp. 1536, 1546 (N.D. Okla. 1997).
12. John C. Roberson, Exemplary Damages for Gross Negligence: A
Definitional Analysis, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 619, 621 (1981).
13. Id.
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negligence (if negligence, at all).14
Based on these interpretations, New York courts fall squarely
into the latter category and require some conscious act on behalf of
an actor to infer gross negligence. These courts view gross
negligence as more than just a heightened degree of negligence,
holding it to be more akin to willful misconduct, as analyzed below
in Section B. To the contrary, Section C of this Article summarizes
the split between Illinois precedent on the issue. While some
Illinois decisions indicate a heightened level of culpability and
elevate gross negligence to the level of recklessness, others
maintain that gross negligence does not differ in kind from
ordinary negligence.

B. New York Law Defines Gross Negligence as Conduct
That Evinces Reckless Disregard for the Rights of
Others or “Smacks” of Intentional Wrongdoing
1. Legal Standard
Under New York law, gross negligence differs, “in kind, not
only degree, from claims of ordinary negligence.”15 A seminal case
decided by New York’s highest court, Colnaghi, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Jewelers Protection Services,16 defined gross negligence as “conduct
that evinces reckless disregard for the rights of others or ‘smacks’
of intentional wrongdoing.”17 Such conduct “represents an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care to the extent that
the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that
the defendant must have been aware of it.”18
Thus, gross negligence is not just a more egregious example of
ordinary negligence; it is more akin to willful misconduct in New
York.19 Even though New York courts do not require an express
intent, the state’s law focuses not only on the gravity of a person’s
deviation from a reasonable standard of care, but also on his or her
14. See id.
15. Colnaghi, U.S.A., Inc. v. Jewelers Prot. Servs., Ltd., 611 N.E.2d 282
(N.Y. 1993).
16. Id. In Colnaghi, a company had failed to protect a skylight, which in
turn enabled burglars to steal valuable paintings from an art gallery. Id. The
Court held that “while perhaps suggestive of negligence or even ‘gross
negligence’ as used elsewhere, [the failure to wire the skylight] does not evince
the recklessness necessary to abrogate [plaintiff's] agreement to absolve
[defendant] from negligence claims.” Id. at 284.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. Saltz v. First Frontier, L.P., 782 F. Supp. 2d 61, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(emphasis added), aff’d, 485 F. App’x 461 (2d Cir. 2012).
19. David Shine, Contractual Applications of Negligence/Gross Negligence
Standards: Considerations Under New York Law, THE M&A LAWYER, 10 (Apr.
2005), available at http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/056EFA67
2B52519D1926370EFAF84809.pdf.

2015]

The Grossly Inconsistent Definitions of “Gross Negligence”

475

subjective state of mind. Accordingly, New York courts may find
gross negligence either “where there is a reckless indifference . . .
or an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty to the public,
in the performance of which the public and the party injured have
interests.”20
To determine whether a person acted with reckless
indifference or disregard, the person’s conduct must show actions
that lack “even slight care” or are “so careless as to show complete
disregard for the rights and safety of others.”21 Similarly, a party
claiming willful misconduct must show an “intentional act of
unreasonable character performed in disregard of a known or
obvious risk so great as to make it highly probable that harm
would result.”22 A noticeable similarity exists in New York’s
definitions of recklessness and willful misconduct in the context of
gross negligence, except the definition of willful misconduct places
more emphasis on the harm that a party’s actions or omissions
have caused.
New York Pattern Jury Instructions further support this
parallel between gross negligence and willful misconduct. Indeed,
although it separates the negligence instruction, the New York
Pattern Jury Instruction 2:10 (PJI 2:10) lists gross negligence and
willful misconduct together. The instruction reads as follows:
In this case, you must decide whether defendant was guilty of (gross
negligence, wilful misconduct). Negligence is a failure to exercise
ordinary care. (Gross Negligence, wilful misconduct) is more than
the failure to exercise reasonable care.
([Use whichever of the following definitions applies])
Gross negligence means a failure to use even slight care, or conduct
that is so careless as to show complete disregard for the rights and
safety of others.
Wilful [misconduct] occurs when a person intentionally acts or fails
to act knowing that (his, her) conduct will probably result in injury
or damage. Wilful misconduct also occurs when a person acts in so
reckless a manner or fails to act in circumstances where an act is
clearly required, so as to indicate disregard of the consequence of
(his, her) action or inaction.23

Thus, although gross negligence is not the same as

20. Int’l Mining Corp. v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 393
N.Y.S.2d 405, 407 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (citing 41 N.Y. JUR. NEGLIGENCE § 28,
now 79 N.Y. JUR. NEGLIGENCE 2d § 39 (1989)).
21. Id.
22. Linda L. Rhodes, Limitations on Liability Exceptions for Gross
Negligence and Willful Misconduct and the Implications for Outsourcing
Agreements, Bus. & Tech. Sourcing, Summer 2013, at 9, http://www.mayerbrown
.com/Limitations-on-Liability-Exceptions-for-Gross-Negligence-and-WillfulMisconduct-and-the-Implications-for-Outsourcing-Agreements-08-13-2013.
23. N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTR., 2:10 (2014).
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intentional misconduct, the courts will find gross negligence if it
“smacks” of intentional wrongdoing or willful misconduct. This
different degree of negligence and its definition is often useful in
contract negotiations, as described below.
2. Gross Negligence and Its Application to Various
Contractual Provisions
Although the definition of gross negligence is important in
various civil and even criminal cases, the narrow scope of this
Article focuses on certain contractual provisions that often
implicate gross negligence within its terms. Such provisions
include limitations of liability, exculpatory clauses, and
indemnification clauses. Even though New York’s standard for
gross negligence is seemingly clear, the use of this standard may
not be enforceable in such contractual contexts.24
New York courts generally hold unenforceable limitations of
liability and exculpatory clauses (i.e., contractual exemptions from
liability) if these provisions exclude liability caused by a party’s
own intentional or grossly negligent conduct.25 Indemnification
clauses, on the other hand, which seek to “simply shift the source
of compensation without restricting the injured party’s ability to
recover,” may be enforceable even when the acts of a party amount
to gross negligence.26 According to New York law, indemnification
agreements are unenforceable and are against public policy only if
the provision seeks to indemnify a party “for damages flowing from
the intentional causation of injuries,” not those caused by gross

24. Shine, supra note 19, at 10.
25. Id. Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 448 N.E.2d 413, 417 (N.Y. 1983)
(stating that “an exculpatory agreement, no matter how flat and unqualified
its terms, will not exonerate a party from liability under all circumstances.
Under announced public policy, it will not apply to exemption of willful or
grossly negligent acts.”).
26. Austro v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 487 N.E.2d 267, 267 (N.Y.
1985).
In Austro, a plaintiff, who was a contractor’s employee, sued the
defendant-power company that had hired the contractor for damages for an
electric shock injury. Id. A jury found that the defendant’s gross negligence
caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The defendant impleaded the employer/
contractor, seeking contractual indemnity pursuant to the construction
contract between the power company and the employer/contractor. The trial
court dismissed the contractual indemnity claim on the grounds that
exculpatory agreements would not be read to exempt a willful or grossly
negligent party from liability to an injured person. Id.
The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled in favor of
the defendant for complete indemnity against the contractor for the
defendant’s gross negligence. Id. New York state’s highest court held that
indemnification agreements are void as against public policy only to the extent
that they purport to indemnify a party “for damages flowing from the
intentional causation of injuries.” Id.
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negligence.27 New York law also allows a party to obtain insurance
as protection against its own gross negligence.28 In this context,
New York courts hold that a waiver of subrogation not only bars
claims of negligence, but also gross negligence.29

C. Courts Interpreting Illinois Law Are Split in Their
Definitions of Gross Negligence
In contrast, Illinois does not have a consistent standard for
gross negligence.30 First, unlike New York, the Illinois Pattern
Jury Instructions, although defining negligence and willful and
wanton misconduct,31 are silent as to the meaning of gross
negligence. Additionally, Illinois case law does not provide much
guidance on the issue either. Even though the courts are
unanimous that gross negligence does not require any intentional
or malicious conduct,32 there is a sharp split between the actual
definitions of gross negligence. Some federal and state courts
define it as (1) very great negligence, whereas others equate it to
(2) recklessness.
1. Gross Negligence Is Very Great Negligence
The most recent definition of gross negligence has been
announced in cases involving gross negligence under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).33

27. Id. (emphasis added). But, see Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 310
(N.Y. 1979), where the New York’s highest court stated, when discussing
indemnity agreements, that “to grant exemption from liability for willful or
grossly negligent acts . . . have been viewed as wholly void.” Id. at 308. The
court recognized, however, that “sophisticated business entities” can make
broad indemnity contracts that will be enforceable, so long as the agreement
reflects the “unmistakable intent of the parties.” Id. at 310. In any event, the
Gross opinion predates the New York Court of Appeals’ decision, six years
later, in Austro.
28. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 815
(N.Y. 1981) (“indemnity for compensatory damages would be allowable” for
acts of “gross negligence, recklessness or wantonness”); Town of Massena v.
Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 779 N.E.2d 167, 171 (N.Y. 2002)
(although insurance coverage for intentional injuries cannot “[a]s a matter of
policy . . . [be] covered by insurance,” insurance coverage for “reckless” conduct
“would not be precluded by public policy”).
29. Great Am. Ins. Co. of New York v. Simplexgrinnell LP, 60 A.D.3d 456,
457 (N.Y.S. 2009) (holding that a waiver of subrogation provision in an
agreement, which is neither overreaching nor procedurally or substantively
unconscionable, bars claims for gross negligence).
30. In fact, Illinois does not seem to really recognize gross negligence as a
separate cause of action, with some exceptions, beyond the scope of this Article.
31. ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTR., 10.1, 14.01 (2014).
32. Chi. City Ry. Co. v. Jordan, 74 N.E. 452, 454 (Ill. 1905).
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k).
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In a 2013 opinion, F.D.I.C. v. Giannoulias,34 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that the
proper standard for gross negligence is “very great negligence,”
which is “something less than the willful, wanton and reckless
conduct.”35 The court in Giannoulias relied on the Illinois Supreme
Court opinion in Massa v. Department of Registration and
Education,36 which announced that “very great negligence” is the
proper standard in Illinois.
As a result, numerous recent decisions, including37 F.D.I.C. v.
Amy,38 F.D.I.C. v. Mahajan,39 F.D.I.C. v. Spangler,40 and F.D.I.C.
v. Gravee,41 support Massa’s definition and hold that gross
negligence does not amount to recklessness. All of these opinions
concur that, while gross negligence contemplates something more
than ordinary negligence, it is still a want of reasonable care
under the circumstances.42
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, while writing for the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, implicitly agreed with this
reasoning as well. 43 In his usual, articulate manner, Judge
Easterbrook explained that:
Gross negligence blends into negligence; there is an indistinct and
unusually invisible line between benefits exceeding the cost of
precautions (negligence) and benefits substantially exceeding the
costs (gross negligence). The malleable quality of these terms has
produced scoffing among many, who see gross negligence as simply
negligence “with the addition of a vituperative epithet.”44

He then summarily concluded that “‘[r]ecklessness’ is a proxy
for intent; [while] ‘gross negligence’ is not.”45 Thus, numerous
cases, citing Judge Easterbrook’s interpretation and adopting
Massa’s definition, agree that gross negligence falls short of
willful, wanton or reckless conduct.46

34. 918 F. Supp. 2d 768 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
35. Id. at 771–72.
36. 507 N.E.2d 814, 819 (Ill. 1987).
37. Listed in chronological order starting with the most recent.
38. 13 C 5888, 2014 WL 1018136 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2014).
39. 11 C 7590, 2012 WL 3061852 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2012).
40. 836 F. Supp. 2d 778 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
41. 966 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
42. Id. at 636–37.
43. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219 (7th Cir. 1988)
(describing gross negligence in the context of Due Process).
44. Id. (citing Wilson v. Brett, [1843] 11 M. & W. 113, 116, 152 Eng. Rep.
737 (Rolfe, B.)) (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. See Gravee, 966 F. Supp. at 636–37; Spangler, 836 F. Supp.2d at 785.

2015]

The Grossly Inconsistent Definitions of “Gross Negligence”

479

2. Gross Negligence Is Recklessness
To the contrary, Resolution Trust Corp. v. Franz47 refused to
follow Massa’s definition of gross negligence and deemed it to
require “something less than intent [but] something more than
negligence.”48 As such, the federal district court equated gross
negligence to “recklessness,”49 or “a course of action which . . .
shows an utter indifference to or a conscious disregard for a
person’s own safety and the safety of others.”50
To support its proposition, the court in Resolution Trust
considered definitions of gross negligence in Illinois criminal law,
secondary sources, and various precedents.51 The court primarily
justified its conclusion by citing the Illinois Supreme Court case,
Ziarko v. Soo Line Railroad Company,52 which indicated that
Illinois courts often use the terms gross negligence and “willful
and wanton conduct” interchangeably:53
[W]illful and wanton conduct has two aspects, a recklessness aspect
and an intentional aspect. If gross negligence is similar to
recklessness, and willfulness and wantonness has an aspect of
recklessness, we would expect Illinois courts to sometimes use gross
negligence and willfulness and wantonness interchangeably. They
would because the intersection of gross negligence and willfulness
and wantonness would be the subset of recklessness.54

According to Resolution Trust and Ziarko, an inevitable
intersection of recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness molds
into gross negligence, creating a hybrid between these terms. This
explanation seems plausible, but it is important to note that when
arriving at this conclusion, the court in Resolution Trust had to
ignore an already established definition in Massa. So, how did
Resolution Trust get around the Illinois Supreme Court precedent?
The court deemed Massa’s definition “unremarkable” and
discounted it for the following four reasons.55 First, it held that

47. 909 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
48. Id. at 1139.
49. Id. See also 28 ILL. LAW & PRAC. NEGLIGENCE § 5.
50. Resolution Trust, 909 F. Supp. at 1141.
51. Id.
[W]e discover that Illinois criminal law defines gross negligence as
recklessness. . . . “[T]he terms . . . ‘gross neglect’ or ‘gross negligence’ are
the historical predecessors of the term ‘recklessness’ and have the same
meanings.” The term recklessness denotes “a course of action which . . .
shows an utter indifference to or a conscious disregard for a person’s
own safety and the safety of others.
Id. at 1141–42 (internal citations omitted).
52. 641 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1994).
53. Id. at 406.
54. Id.; see also Oropeza v. Bd. of Educ., 606 N.E.2d 482, 484–85 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992) (defining “willful and wanton negligence”).
55. Resolution Trust, 909 F. Supp. at 1141.
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Massa’s definition of gross negligence as “very great negligence” is
not “helpful.”56 “What is very great negligence?”57 the court
justifiably questioned. Second, the court indicated that Massa used
the definition “out of context.”58 Third, it specified that Massa’s
definition is a “dead letter” because “in the over eight years since
the court handed down Massa, no other court has cited its
definition of gross negligence . . . despite the subsequent
watershed opinions in the area of comparable culpability.”59
Lastly, Massa defined “gross negligence at the low end of that
term’s possible culpability range, but due process leads [courts] to
define it at the high end.”60 For all of these reasons, Resolution
Trust ignored the decision and held that gross negligence is
recklessness in Illinois.61
To complicate things even further, the Resolution Trust’s
rationale is not novel or uncommon in Illinois jurisprudence.62 In
fact, centuries of various precedents have supported this view. For
years, other courts have used gross negligence in the context of
recklessness and stated that “gross negligence . . . implies a willful
injury,”63 or “just[ies] the presumption of willfulness or
wantonness” if it “impl[ies] a disregard of consequences or a
willingness to inflict injury.”64
In sum, there is no uniform definition of gross negligence
amongst Illinois courts. Given the recent cases stating that gross
negligence is “very great negligence”65 that falls short of
recklessness, Massa’s definition does not seem to be “unhelpful”
anymore. Perhaps now, it is Resolution Trust’s holding that has
become the “dead letter” in Illinois. Thus, this Article subjectively
concludes that the proper definition of gross negligence is “very
great negligence,” which places Illinois interpretation in line with
the view of other states, such as Vermont, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, to name a few.66
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing to Ziarko, 641 N.E.2d 402).
60. Id.
61. See also Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., No. 04 C
6878, 2007 WL 4198233, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2007) (citing Franz and
stating that Illinois law defines “gross negligence” and “willful misconduct” as
“‘recklessness,’ which means a conscious and deliberate disregard for the
rights or safety of others”).
62. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Beard, 49 Ill. App. 232, 1893 WL 1992 (4th Dist.
1893) (stating that “[g]ross negligence of itself is not, in law, designed and
intentional mischief, although it may be cogent evidence of such fact.”).
63. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Goodwin, 30 Ill. 117, 118 (1863).
64. Bremer v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 148 N.E. 862, 866 (Ill. 1925).
65. Gravee, 966 F. Supp. at 636–37 (citing Massa with approval and
declining to follow Ziarko’s approach).
66. See Part III, Reference Table, infra (listing definitions across
jurisdictions).

2015]

The Grossly Inconsistent Definitions of “Gross Negligence”

481

IV. CONCLUSION AND REFERENCE TABLE
The concept of gross negligence is difficult to define. The term
is “so nebulous” as to have “no generally accepted meaning.”67
Although courts in New York seem to have a better articulated
definition of gross negligence, courts in many other jurisdictions,
including Illinois, continue to battle with the proper meaning of
this tort.
To illustrate the drastic difference between various
jurisdictions, below is a table briefly summarizing the definitions
of “gross negligence” in all fifty states.

Reference Table: Definitions of “Gross
Negligence” Across Jurisdictions
Jurisdiction

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Precedent
(internal citations are omitted for brevity purposes)
See Miller v. Bailey, 60 So. 3d 857, 867 (Ala. 2010)
(“‘Gross negligence’ is negligence, not wantonness”); Ridgely
Operating Co. v. White, 150 So. 693, 695 (Ala. 1933)
(“Ordinarily, ‘gross negligence’ imports nothing more than
simple negligence or want of due care.”); Fid.-Phoenix Fire Ins.
Co. v. Lawler, 81 So. 2d 908, 912 (Ala. Ct. App. 1955) (“[T]he
word ‘gross’ when used in connection with negligence, implies
nothing more than negligence.”).
See Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61, 65 (Alaska 1968)
(stating that “[g]ross negligence differs from ordinary
negligence in several important particulars” and requiring
some “conscious choice of a course of action”). Specifically, the
court pointed out that “gross negligence” differs from
“ordinary negligence” in that latter consists of mere
inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or failure to take
precautions and gross negligence requires conscious choice of
course of action with knowledge that it contains risk of harm
to others. (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 500, cmt. g (1965) to point out differentiating factors).
Williams v. Thude, 934 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Ariz. 1997)
(“Gross negligence and wanton conduct have generally been
treated as one and the same.”) (citing DeElena v. S. Pac. Co.,
592 P.2d 759, 762 (Ariz. 1979) (“[I]t is settled that wanton
misconduct is aggravated negligence.”); Kemp v. Pinal Cnty.,
13 Ariz. App. 121, 124, 474 P.2d 840 (Ariz. App. 1970) (“A
person can be very negligent and still not be guilty of gross
negligence.”); see also Harrelson v. Dupnik, 970 F. Supp. 2d
953, 975 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“Gross negligence is different from
ordinary negligence ‘in quality and not degree.’).

67. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11.
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See Doe v. Baum, 72 S.W.3d 476, 487 (Ark. 2002) (citing
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY and using “gross negligence and
“reckless negligence” interchangeably); but see Spence v.
Vaught, 367 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Ark. 1963) (“Negligence is the
failure to use ordinary care . . . . Gross negligence is the failure
to use even slight care . . . . Willful negligence is the same as
gross negligence with the added factor that the actor knows, or
the situation is so extremely dangerous that he should know,
that his act or failure to act will probably cause harm.”)
See City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 161 P.3d
1095, 1099 Cal. 2007) (“Gross negligence long has been
defined in California and other jurisdictions as either a want
of even scant care or an extreme departure from the ordinary
standard of conduct.”); Donnelly v. S. Pac. Co., 118 P.2d 465,
468–69 (Cal. 1941) (explaining that “[w]illfulness and
negligence are contradictory terms”). Specifically, the court
stated:
If conduct is negligent, it is not willful; if it is willful, it
is not negligent. It is frequently difficult, however, to
characterize conduct as willful or negligent. A tort
having some of the characteristics of both negligence
and willfulness occurs when a person with no intent to
cause harm intentionally performs an act so
unreasonable and dangerous that he knows, or should
know, it is highly probable that harm will result. Such
a tort has been labelled ‘willful negligence’, ‘wanton and
willful negligence’, ‘wanton and willful misconduct’, and
even ‘gross negligence’. It is most accurately designated
as wanton and reckless misconduct. It involves no
intention, as does willful misconduct, to do harm, and if
differs from negligence in that it does involve an
intention to perform an act that the actor knows, or
should know, will very probably cause harm.
Id. at 468–69.
See Adams v. Colo. & S. Ry. Co., 113 P. 1010 (1911)
(degrees of negligence are not recognized in Colorado); Hamill
v. Cheley Colo. Camps, Inc., 262 P.3d 945, 954 (Colo. App.
2011) (“Gross negligence is willful and wanton conduct, that
is, action committed recklessly, with conscious disregard for
the safety of others.”)
See 19 Perry St., LLC v. Unionville Water Co., 987 A.2d
1009, 1022, n. 10, 11 (Conn. 2010) (summarizing that the
court “ha[s] defined gross negligence as ‘very great or
excessive negligence, or as the want of, or failure to exercise,
even slight or scant care or slight diligence’” (quoting 57A Am.
Jur. 2d 296–97, Negligence § 227 (2004)); see also 57A Am.
Jur. 2d 296–97, Negligence § 227 (2004) (“Gross negligence
means more than momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence
or error of judgment; hence, it requires proof of something
more than the lack of ordinary care. It implies an extreme
departure from the ordinary standard of care, aggravated
disregard for the rights and safety of others, or negligence
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substantially and appreciably greater than ordinary
negligence.”); Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d
734, 756 (Conn. 2005) (Norcott, J., dissenting) (“This court
has construed gross negligence to mean no care at all, or the
omission of such care which even the most inattentive and
thoughtless seldom fail to make their concern, evincing a
reckless temperament and lack of care, practically [wilful] in
its nature.”).
See Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 530 (Del. 1987)
(“Gross negligence, though criticized as a nebulous concept,
signifies more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention. It is
nevertheless a degree of negligence, while recklessness
connotes a different type of conduct akin to the intentional
infliction of harm.”).
In Delaware tort law the term “gross negligence” has
little significance. Simple negligence suffices for
recovery of compensatory damages, and where reckless
(wanton) or wilful conduct is required, either as a
threshold for recovery . . . or as a prerequisite for the
recovery of punitive damages, even gross negligence
will not suffice.) The Court also specifically pointed out
that certain Delaware decisions used to equate gross
negligence with recklessness, but declined to deem
those authoritative. Id. at n. 9.
See Vallejos v. Lan Cargo S.A., 116 So. 3d 545, 552 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“Gross negligence requires: (1)
circumstances constituting an imminent or clear and present
danger amounting to a more than normal or usual peril, (2)
knowledge or awareness of the imminent danger on the part
of the tortfeasor, and (3) an act or omission that evinces a
conscious disregard of the consequences.”).
See Johnson v. Omondi, 751 S.E.2d 288, 291 (Ga. 2013)
(stating that
gross negligence is the absence of even slight diligence,
and slight diligence is defined in OCGA § 51–1–4 as
“that degree of care which every man of common sense,
however inattentive he may be, exercises under the
same or similar circumstances.” In other words, gross
negligence has been defined as “equivalent to (the)
failure to exercise even a slight degree of care[,]” or
“lack of the diligence that even careless men are
accustomed to exercise.”);
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Denson, 11 S.E. 1039, 1041 (Ga. 1890)
(“Gross negligence may be ‘so gross as to amount to
wantonness or recklessness.’”).
See Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 919 P.2d 263, 285 (Haw. 1996);
see also Pancakes of Hawaii, Inc. v. Pomare Props. Corp., 944
P.2d 83, 90 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that “[g]ross
negligence . . . is a step below willful misconduct” but is not
synonymous with “negligence”). The court further cited to the
following definition:
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Gross negligence includes indifference to a present
legal duty and . . . utter forgetfulness of legal
obligations so far as other persons may be affected. It is
a heedless and palpable violation of a legal duty
respecting the rights of others. The element of
culpability that characterizes all negligence is in gross
negligence magnified to a high degree as compared with
that present in ordinary negligence. Gross negligence is
a manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness and
circumspection than the circumstances require of a
person of ordinary prudence. But it is something less
than willful, wanton and reckless conduct.
Id.

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

See S. Griffin Const., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 16 P.3d
278, 286 (Idaho 2000) (collecting cases and stating that
common law definitions of gross negligence typically include
(1) “[t]he want of even a slight care and diligence,”(2) “the
want of that diligence that even careless men are accustomed
to exercise,” and (3) “the want of that care which every man of
common sense, however inattentive he may be, takes of his
own property”). In other words, “negligence means just what
it indicates, gross or great negligence; that is negligence in a
very high degree.” Id.
See supra Part C.
See S.C. Nestel, Inc. v. Future Constr., Inc., 836 N.E.2d
445, 451 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Wohlwend v. Edwards, 796
N.E.2d 781, 785, n. 2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that the
“[u]se of the term ‘gross negligence’ is inappropriate in
Indiana because [Indiana’s] common law does not recognize
degrees of negligence”); accord Wilshire Serv. Corp. v. Timber
Ridge P’ship, 743 N.E.2d 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Surratt v.
Petrol, Inc., 316 N.E.2d 453, 453–54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
See Thompson v. Bohlken, 312 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa
1981) (“The term ‘gross negligence’ is said to be nebulous,
without a generally-accepted meaning: It implies conduct
which, while more culpable than ordinary inadvertence or
unattention, differs from ordinary negligence only in degree,
not kind.”); Sechler v. State, 340 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Iowa 1983)
(noting that Iowa does not recognize degrees of negligence)
(citing Hendricks v. Broderick, 284 N.W.2d 209, 214 (Iowa
1979))).
See Koster v. Matson, 30 P.2d 107, 110 (Kan. 1934)
(collecting cases and explaining that the Kansas common law
recognizes degrees of negligence and gross negligence consists
of failure to exercise slight care); Atchinson v. Baker, 98 P.
804, 807 (Kan. 1908) (explaining that terms “gross negligence”
and “willful and wanton conduct” should not be confused).
See Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 52
(Ky. 2003); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 181 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1944) (“Two degrees of negligence are recognized in
Kentucky: ‘Ordinary negligence,’ or the failure to exercise
that care which ordinarily prudent persons would exercise in
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like or similar circumstances; and ‘gross negligence,’ which is
the absence of slight care.”).

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

See Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Dep’t. Ambulance
Serv., 639 So.2d 216, 219-20 (La.1994) (internal quotations
and citations omitted) (“Gross negligence has been defined as
the want of that diligence which even careless men are
accustomed to exercise. Gross negligence has also been
termed the entire absence of care and the utter disregard of
the dictates of prudence, amounting to complete neglect of the
rights of others. Additionally, gross negligence has been
described as an extreme departure from ordinary care or the
want of even scant care.”); Brown v. Lee, 929 So. 2d 775 (La.
Ct. App. 2006) (defining “gross negligence” as “want of even
slight care and diligence, and want of that diligence which
even careless men are accustomed to exercise”).
See Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610, 612 (Me. 1970)
(stating “[t]here are no degrees of care and no degrees of
negligence in this State”), overruled in part; see also
Wahlcometroflex, Inc. v. Baldwin, 991 A.2d 44, 48 (defining
the term in context of business judgment rule). “Gross
negligence is defined as ‘reckless indifference to or a
deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders or
actions which are without the bounds of reason.’” Id. (internal
citations to Delaware law are omitted).
See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 665
(Md. 1992) (collecting cases and discussing the term in the
context of punitive damages); see also Liscombe v. Potomac
Edison Co., 495 A.2d 838, 845–47 (Md. Ct. App. 1985)
(Gross negligence is a technical term, it is the omission
of that care “which even inattentive and thoughtless
men never fail to take of their own property,” it is a
violation of good faith . . . . [Gross negligence] is an
intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in
reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the
life or property of another, and also implies a
thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the
exertion of any effort to avoid them. Stated conversely,
a wrongdoer is guilty of gross negligence or acts
wantonly and willfully only when he inflicts injury
intentionally or is so utterly indifferent to the rights of
others that he acts as if such rights did not exist.)
See Altman v. Aronson, 121 N.E. 505, 506 (Mass. 1919)
(adopting classic definition:
Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably
higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence. It is
materially more want of care than constitutes simple
inadvertence. It is an act or omission respecting legal
duty of an aggravated character as distinguished from
a mere failure to exercise ordinary care. It is very great
negligence, or the absence of slight diligence, or the
want of even scant care. It amounts to indifference to
present legal duty and to utter forgetfulness of legal
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obligations so far as other persons may be affected. It is
a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty
respecting the rights of others. The element of
culpability which characterizes all negligence is in
gross negligence magnified to a high degree as
compared with that present in ordinary negligence.
Gross negligence is a manifestly smaller amount of
watchfulness
and
circumspection
than
the
circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence.
But it is something less than the willful, wanton and
reckless conduct which renders a defendant who has
injured another liable to the latter even though guilty
of contributory negligence, or which renders a
defendant in rightful possession of real estate liable to
a trespasser whom he has injured. It falls short of being
such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is
equivalent to a willful and intentional wrong. Ordinary
and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention,
while both differ in kind from willful and intentional
conduct which is or ought to be known to have a
tendency to injure. This definition does not possess the
exactness of a mathematical demonstration, but it is
what the law now affords.
Id.

Michigan

Minnesota

See also Christopher v. Father’s Huddle Café, Inc., 782
N.E.2d 517, 529 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (stating that ordinary
and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention, while
both differ in kind from willful and intentional conduct which
is or ought to be known to have a tendency to injure).
See Jennings v. Southwood, 521 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Mich.
1994) (adopting gross negligence definition under EMSA and
overruling common-law definition in the seminal case
Gibbard v. Cursan, 196 N.W. 398 (Mich. 1923)). “Gross
negligence, as defined in Gibbard, is not a high-degree or
level of negligence. On the contrary, it is merely ordinary
negligence of the defendant that follows the negligence of the
plaintiff follow[ed] from the negligence of the plaintiff.” Id.
See High v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of
Moose, 7 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Minn. 1943) (“Negligence of the
highest degree is gross negligence. We defined gross
negligence as meaning ‘negligence in a very high degree,’
‘great or excessive negligence.’” (citing Dakins v. Black, 261
N.W. 870, 872 (Minn. 1935))).
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See W. Cash & Carry Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Palumbo,
371 So. 2d 873, 877 (Miss. 1979) (“There is no precise
definition of gross negligence, but one of the approximate
definitions may be thus expressed: Gross negligence is that
course of conduct which, under the particular circumstances,
discloses a reckless indifference to consequences without the
exertion of any substantial effort to avoid them. The facts of
this case, as the statement thereof reveals, bring it well
within that definition and principle.”); see also Turner v. City
of Ruleville, 735 So. 2d 226, 230 (Miss. 1999).
See Lyons v. Corder, 162 S.W. 606, 609 (Mo. 1913);
Hatch v. V.P. Fair Found., Inc., 990 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999); Duncan v. Mo. Bd. for Architects, Prof’l Eng’rs & Land
Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d 524, 532–33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Wall
v. Weiler, 200 S.W. 731, 734 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918); Horton v.
Terminal Hotel & Arcade Co., 89 S.W. 363, 364 (Mo. Ct. App.
1905) (“[O]mission to use the degree of care which even the
most inattentive and thoughtless never failed to take of their
own concerns.”).
See Rusk v. Skillman, 514 P.2d 587, 589 (Mont. 1973)
(defining gross negligence as the “failure to use slight care.”);
Liston v. Reynolds, 223 P. 507, 511–12 (Mont. 1924) (“Under
the law of this state a difference in degrees of negligence is
recognized . . . . ‘A willful act involves no negligence. It is a
contradiction in terms to say that an act was done “willfully
and negligently.”’”).
See Palmer v. Lakeside Wellness Ctr., 281 Neb. 780,
786, 798 N.W.2d 845, 850 (2011) (“Gross negligence is great or
excessive negligence, which indicates the absence of even
slight care in the performance of a duty. Whether gross
negligence exists must be ascertained from the facts and
circumstances of each particular case and not from any fixed
definition or rule.”).
See Stiff v. Holmes, 450 P.2d 153, 155 (Nev. 1969) (“In
its simplest definition gross negligence means nothing more
nor less than ‘great negligence.’”) (quoting Rogers v. S. Pac.
Co., 227 P.2d 979, 982 (Or. 1951) (guest statute context); Hart
v. Kline, 116 P.2d 672, 673–74 (Nev. 1941).
See Corrigan v. Clark, 36 A.2d 631, 632 (N.H. 1944)
(adopting “classic” definition from Altman, 121 N.E. at 506).
Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably
higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence. It is
materially more want of care than constitutes simple
inadvertence. It is an act or omission respecting legal
duty of an aggravated character as distinguished from
a mere failure to exercise ordinary care. It is very great
negligence, or the absence of slight diligence, or the
want of even scant care. It amounts to indifference to
present legal duty and to utter forgetfulness of legal
obligations so far as other persons may be affected. It is
a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty
respecting the rights of others. The element of
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culpability which characterizes all negligence is in
gross negligence magnified to a high degree as
compared with that present in ordinary negligence.
Gross negligence is a manifestly smaller amount of
watchfulness
and
circumspection
than
the
circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence.
But it is something less than the willful, wanton and
reckless conduct which renders a defendant who has
injured another liable to the latter even though guilty
of contributory negligence, or which renders a
defendant in rightful possession of real estate liable to
a trespasser whom he has injured. It falls short of being
such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is
equivalent to a willful and intentional wrong. Ordinary
and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention,
while both differ in kind from willful and intentional
conduct which is or ought to be known to have a
tendency to injure. This definition does not possess the
exactness of a mathematical demonstration, but it is
what the law now affords.
Altman, 121 N.E. at 506.
See Kain v. Gloucester City, 94 A.3d 937, 947 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014)
(“Although the statute does not define gross negligence,
the term is commonly associated with egregious
conduct, see Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 975 A.2d
494, 508, n.6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009), aff’d, 1
A.3d 678 (N.J. 2010), and is used to describe ‘the upper
reaches of negligent conduct.’ Parks v. Pep Boys, 659
A.2d 471, 478, n.6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.Div.1995).”);
Oliver v. Kantor, 6 A.2d 205, 207 (N.J. 1939)
(Gross negligence is a relative term that does not lend
itself to precise definition automatically resolving every
case. It was introduced into the common law from the
civil law; and, on the hypothesis that in a case such as
this the duty imposed by the law is to exercise such
care as is commensurate with the risk of danger, the
modern trend is to reject the common-law divisions of
negligence into “gross,” “ordinary” and “slight,” as
having “no distinctive meaning or importance in the
law,” and tending to uncertainty and confusion in cases
such as this, where the duty claimed to have been
breached does not have a statutory or contractual origin
. . . . At most, the difference between “gross” and
“ordinary” negligence is one of degree rather than of
quality. While there is authority for the view that gross
negligence is not characterized by inadvertence, but
connotes “some degree of intent to cause” injury, the
commonly accepted definition of the term is the want or
absence of, or failure to exercise, slight care or diligence.
This seems to be the definition at common law.).
See Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 880 P.2d 300,
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309 (N.M. 1994) (stating that “the concept of gross negligence
. . . is a legal anachronism in New Mexico”).
See supra Part B.
See Yancey v. Lea, 550 S.E.2d 155, 157 (N.C. 2001)
(using the terms “gross negligence” and “willful and wanton
conduct” interchangeably to refer to conduct that is
“somewhere between ordinary negligence and intentional
conduct.”) “Gross negligence” is defined as “wanton conduct
done with conscious or reckless disregard for the rights and
safety of others,” and an act is said to be wanton “when it is
done of wicked purpose, or when done needlessly, manifesting
a reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Id. See also
Boryla-Lett v. Psychiatric Solutions of N. Carolina, Inc., 685
S.E.2d 14, 19 (N.C. App. 2009) (“The distinction between
negligence and gross negligence is not merely a question of
degree of inadvertence or carelessness but one of reckless
disregard.”).
See Sheets v. Pendergrast, 106 N.W.2d 1, 5 (N.D. 1960)
(“[G]ross negligence is, to all intents and purposes, no care at
all. It is the omission of such care which even the most
inattentive and thoughtless persons seldom fail to take of
their own affairs, and it is such conduct as evidences a
reckless temperament. It is such a lack of care that it is
practically willful in its nature.”).
See Payne v. Vance, 133 N.E. 85, 88 (Ohio 1921)
(discussing
cases
from
various
jurisdictions
and
distinguishing between “willful tort” and “wanton negligence”
as follows: “Willful tort involves the element of intent or
purpose, and is therefore distinguished from negligence,
whatever may be its grade, whether slight, ordinary, or
gross.”); Vidovic v. Hoynes, No. 2014–L–054, 2015 WL
854862 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2015)(“For gross negligence, a
plaintiff must show willful and wanton conduct, as well as the
intentional failure to perform a duty in reckless disregard of
the consequences as affecting the life or property of
another.”); Winkle v. Zettler Funeral Homes, Inc., 912 N.E.2d
151, 161 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotations and
citations omitted) (“Gross negligence is defined as ‘the failure
to exercise any or very slight care’ or ‘a failure to exercise
even that care which a careless person would use.’”); Jackman
v. Karg, No. 16-84-2, 1985 WL 9116, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr.
30, 1985) (“[T]he Ohio Supreme court defined gross negligence
as that ‘neglect of duty which amounts to wilfulness and
evinces a reckless disregard of the rights of others.’”).
See Myers v. Lashley, 44 P.3d 553, 563, as amended
(Okla. Mar. 20, 2002) (“Gross negligence is characterized as
reckless indifference to the consequences; it falls short of an
intentional wrong's equivalent.”)
See State v. Hodgdon, 416 P.2d 647, 649 (1966) (citing
Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56 (1960) and stating that
“gross negligence” is more than just an “inadvertent breach of
duty” or “imprudent conduct,” but is an act accompanied by
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conscious indifference to rights of others or negligence which
is increased in magnitude by actor’s reckless disregard of
rights of others); Howard v. Chimps, Inc., 251 Or. App. 636,
647, 284 P.3d 1181 (2012), rev. den., 353 Or. 410, 298 P.3d
1226 (2013) (“To establish gross negligence, [the] plaintiff
needed to show that [the] defendant acted with reckless
disregard of safety or indifference to the probable
consequences of its acts.”).
See Kasanovich v. George, 34 A.2d 523, 525 (Pa. 1943)
(“It must be understood, of course, that wanton misconduct is
something different from negligence however gross,-different
not merely in degree but in kind, and evincing a different
state of mind on the part of the tortfeasor. Negligence consists
of inattention or inadvertence, whereas wantonness exists
where the danger to the plaintiff, though realized, is so
recklessly disregarded that, even though there be no actual
intent, there is at least a willingness to inflict injury, a
conscious indifference to the perpetration of the wrong.”); see
also Keystone Freight Corp. v. Stricker, 31 A.3d 967, 973 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2011) (“Gross negligence is defined as the want of
even scant care and the failure to exercise even that care
which a careless person would use.”) (context of malicious
prosecution claim); Bloom v. Dubois Reg’l Med. Ctr., 597 A.2d
671, 678-79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (providing a detailed
summary of the conflict); Krivijanski v. Union R.R. Co., 515
A.2d 933, 937 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
The prevailing rule in most situations is that there are
no “degrees” of care or negligence, as a matter of law; there
are only different amounts of care, as a matter of fact. From
this perspective, “gross” negligence is merely the same thing
as ordinary negligence, “with the addition, . . . of a
vituperative epithet.”
Cases in Pennsylvania do not provide clear guidance. In
Henry v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 459 A.2d 772 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983), a panel of this court noted that gross
negligence was simply a different degree of negligence and
both were premised on the violation of a duty of care owed to
the plaintiff. In contrast, the Commonwealth Court defines
gross negligence as failure to perform a duty in reckless
disregard of the consequences or with such want of care as to
justify a conclusion of willfulness or wantonness. Williams v.
State Civil Serv. Comm., 306 A.2d 419, 422 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1973), aff’d on other grounds, 327 A.2d 70 (Pa. 1974). On the
other hand, the Supreme Court has opined on gross
negligence in the context of a recent bailment case as follows:
“. . . there are no degrees of negligence in Pennsylvania. There
are and always have been differing standards of care,
however, at least in bailment cases. . . .” Ferrick Excavating v.
Senger Trucking Co., 484 A.2d 744, 749 (Pa. 1984).
Although there has not been universal agreement as to
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the meaning of the term gross negligence, it is clear that the
term does not encompass wanton or reckless behavior. Bloom,
597 A.2d at 678–79 (citations in original).
See Leonard v. Bartle, 135 A. 853, 854 (R.I. 1927)
(stating that Rhode Island never recognized degrees of
negligence, but differentiating based on degrees of care)
See Clark v. S. Carolina Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 608 S.E.2d
573, 576–77 (S.C. 2005) (“Gross negligence is the intentional
conscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon
one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought
not to do. Gross negligence is also the “failure to exercise
slight care” and is “a relative term and means the absence of
care that is necessary under the circumstances.”) Steinke v.
S.C. Dep’t of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 520 S.E.2d 142,
153 (S.C. 1999); Clyburn v. Sumter Cnty. Sch. Dist. # 17, 451
S.E.2d 885, 887 (S.C. 1994); Solanki v. Wal-Mart Store, 763
S.E.2d 615 (S.C. Ct. App. 2014), reh’g denied (Oct. 23, 2014);
Chakrabarti v. City of Orangeburg, 743 S.E.2d 109, 113 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2013) (recognizing gross negligence as a cause of
action), reh’g denied (June 20, 2013) The Chakrabarti court
also stated, “Gross negligence is the intentional conscious
failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do
or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do”
and “[g]ross negligence has also been defined as a relative
term, and means the absence of care that is necessary under
the circumstances.” Id.
See Holzer v. Dakota Speedway, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 787,
793 (S.D. 2000) (citing to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500
(1965) and stating that “[c]onduct is gross, willful, wanton, or
reckless when a person acts or fails to act, with a conscious
realization that injury is a probable, as distinguished from a
possible (ordinary negligence), result of such conduct.”)
(emphasis in original).
See Inter-City Trucking Co. v. Daniels, 178 S.W.2d 756,
757 (Tenn. 1944) (interpreting gross negligence as “such
entire want of care as would raise a presumption of conscious
indifference to consequences,” and wanton negligence is a
“heedless and reckless disregard for another's rights with the
consciousness that the acts or omission to act may result in
injury to another.”).
See Reeder v. Wood Cnty. Energy, LLC, 395 S.W.3d 789,
796 (Tex. 2012), op. supplemented on reh’g (Mar. 29, 2013)
(“Gross negligence has both an objective and a subjective
component.”) To prove the subjective component, “courts focus
on the defendant's state of mind, examining whether the
defendant knew about the peril caused by his conduct but
acted in a way that demonstrates he did not care about the
consequences to others.” Id. “Determining whether an act or
omission involves peril requires an examination of the events
and circumstances from the viewpoint of the defendant at the
time the events occurred, without viewing the matter in
hindsight.” Id. “An act or omission that is merely ineffective,
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thoughtless, careless, or not inordinately risky is not grossly
negligent.” Id.

Utah

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

West Virginia

See Daniels v. Gamma W. Brachytherapy, LLC, 221
P.3d 256, 269 (“This court has consistently defined gross
negligence as ‘the failure to observe even slight care; it is
carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter
indifference to the consequences that may result.’
Recklessness is subsumed in this court’s definition of gross
negligence.”).
See Kennery v. State, 38 A.3d 35, 49 (Vt. 2011) (citing
Shaw v. Moore, 162 A. 373, 374 (Vt. 1932)).
Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably
higher in magnitude and more culpable than ordinary
negligence. Gross negligence is equivalent to the failure
to exercise even a slight degree of care. . . . It is very
great negligence, or the absence of slight diligence, or
the want of even scant care. It amounts to indifference
to present legal duty, and to utter forgetfulness of legal
obligations so far as other persons may be affected. It is
a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty
respecting the rights of others.
Id.
See Cowan v. Hospice Support Care, Inc., 603 S.E.2d
916, 918 (Va. 2004). (“‘Gross negligence’ is a degree of
negligence showing indifference to another and an utter
disregard of prudence that amounts to a complete neglect of
the safety of such other person. This requires a degree of
negligence that would shock fair-minded persons, although
demonstrating something less than willful recklessness.”)
Under Virginia law, gross negligence represents an act or
omission more serious than simple negligence, “which
involves the failure to use the degree of care that an
ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar
circumstances to avoid injury to another.” Id.
Nist v. Tudor, 407 P.2d 798, 802 (Wash. 1965) (gross
negligence is failure to exercise slight care, which is
“negligence substantially and appreciably greater than
ordinary negligence”); Kelley v. State, 17 P.3d 1189, 1192
(2000).
See Kelly v. Checker White Cab, 50 S.E.2d 888, 892 (W.
Va. 1948)
(Negligence conveys the idea of heedlessness,
inattention, inadvertence; willfulness and wantonness
convey the idea of purpose or design, actual or
constructive. In some jurisdictions they are used to
signify a higher degree of neglect than gross negligence.
In order that one may be held guilty of wilful or wanton
conduct, it must be shown that he was conscious of his
conduct, and conscious, from his knowledge of existing
conditions, that injury would likely or probably result
from his conduct, and that with reckless indifference to
consequences he consciously and intentionally did some
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wrongful act or omitted some known duty which
produced the injurious result.).

Wisconsin

Wyoming

See Twist v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 81 N.W.2d 523, 525–
26 (Wis. 1957) (“To constitute gross negligence there must be
either a wilful intent to injure, or that reckless or wanton
disregard of the rights and safety of another or his property,
and that willingness to inflict injury, which the law deems
equivalent to an intent to injure.”); O’Shea v. Lavoy, 185 N.W.
525 (Wis. 1921).
See Mayflower Rest. Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1115
(Wyo. 1987) (“Although degrees of negligence are not
considered in comparative negligence, it must be remembered
that the traditional concept of gross negligence visualized less
culpable conduct than willful and wanton conduct.”).
Moreover, the courts defined gross negligence as:
Indifference to present legal duty and to utter
forgetfulness of legal obligations so far as other persons
may be affected. It is a heedless and palpable violation
of legal duty respecting the rights of others. The
element of culpability which characterizes all
negligence is in gross negligence magnified to a high
degree as compared with that present in ordinary
negligence. Gross negligence is a manifestly smaller
amounts of watchfulness and circumspection than the
circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence.
But it is something less than the willful, wanton and
reckless conduct.
Id.

